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I. INTRODUcTION
The tender offer for purchase of corporate shares clearly has
emerged as the principal method of overtaking control of an existing
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public corporation.' Although a tender offer may assume various
forms, 2 typically the tender offeror publicly or privately announces
its intent to purchase a substantial number of shares from share-
holders of the target company at some price above market value.'
A tender offer proposal, therefore, often presents to target share-
holders an investment opportunity unavailable in the general mar-
ket. Conversely, target directors generally perceive a tender offer as
a direct threat to the target's continued autonomy and to their
positions as corporate leaders.5 In response to this perceived threat,
and to the time pressures imposed by the offeror," directors often
implement defense tactics designed to defeat the tender offer pro-
posal.7 The successful defense against a tender offer, however, de-
prives target shareholders of a potentially large investment gain. In
response to several recent successful defense maneuvers, target
shareholders have brought suit against their directors, alleging that
the directors' implementation of defense tactics constituted mis-
management and a breach of fiduciary obligations to the target
shareholders.'
Prior to the federal district court opinion in Altman v. Knight,9
shareholders brought the great majority of these mismanagement
1. During the 1950's and early 1960's, the proxy battle reigned as the ultimate weapon
for gaining control of public corporations. See generally E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, PaoxY
CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL (1968). In the 1960's, however, the tender offer displaced
the proxy contest as the principal takeover method. See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER
OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL, at v-vi (1973) [hereinafter cited as TENDER OFFERS].
2. See notes 17-19 infra and accompanying text.
3. For purposes of convenience in discussion, the individual or corporation proposing
the tender offer will be referred to as the offeror. The company whose securities the offeror
proposes to purchase will be referred to as the target.
4. To enhance the tender offer's chances for success, the offeror will offer an exchange
price substantially in excess of market or book value. See Greenhill, Structuring an Offer, 32
Bus. LAW. 1305 (1977); Weiss, Tender Offers and Management Responsibility, 23 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 445 (1978).
5. A prime consideration in an offeror's decision to bid for the purchase of a target
company is the present inability or incompetency of the target's directors and management.
See Troubh, Takeover Strategy: The Investment Banker's Role: Characteristics of Target
Companies, 32 Bus. LAW. 1301 (1977). Consequently, the offeror often intends to displace
existing management upon the tender offer's success. For a discussion of the investment
impact of the offeror's desire to replace existing target management, see Gulf & Western
Indus. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687, 696 (2d Cir. 1973).
6. A tender offer proposal usually will remain open for two to three weeks only. See
Weiss, supra note 4, at 445 n.1; Note, The Courts and the Williams Act: Try a Little
Tenderness, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991, 993 (1973).
7. See notes 38-48 infra and accompanying text.
8. E.g., Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978); Altman
v. Knight, 431 F. Supp. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Northwest Indus. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F.
Supp. 706 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
9. 431 F. Supp. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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claims in federal court, alleging that their directors' actions violated
federal securities laws." In Altman, however, the court held that if
a shareholder's claim against target directors for resisting a tender
offer alleges only that those directors breached their fiduciary du-
ties, a cause of action does not lie under federal law." Therefore,
after Altman, the greater number of shareholder claims against tar-
get directors for defeating a tender offer must be filed in state court
and must assert a cause of action under state law. Recently, how-
ever, state courts have applied inconsistent fiduciary standards in
factually similar shareholder suits" and, for the most part, the stan-
dards that have been applied permit directors to resist tender offer
proposals without accounting for the resulting loss to shareholders.
This Note will review recent decisions applying state law fidu-
ciary standards and will propose procedural and substantive modifi-
cations to existing standards. The proposed modifications will com-
pel target directors to recognize and fulfill fiduciary obligations
when faced with a decision whether or not to resist a tender offer.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE TENDER OFFER AS A METHOD FOR OBTAINING
CORPORATE CONTROL
Since the tender offer for corporate control displaced the proxy
contest as the most commonly used takeover device, the frequency
and magnitude of tender offers has exceeded even the broadest pre-
dictions. 3 Accompanying this increased activity has been the ma-
turation of tender offer mechanics and defense techniques." With
the adoption and implementation of federal securities laws empha-
sizing disclosure to prospective target shareholders,'- the target
directors' responsibilities during the pendency of the tender offer
proposal have become increasingly difficult to meet within time
10. The majority of mismanagement claims brought before 1977 claimed that the tar-
get's directors violated sections 10(b) and 14(e) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78h(e) (1976).
11. See notes 81-88 infra and accompanying text.
12. See Part I1(B) infra.
13. See E. ARANow, H. EINHORN, & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL, at vi (1977) [hereinafter cited as DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS]. An
excerpt from Ehrbar, Corporate Takeovers Are Here to Stay, FORTUNE, May 8, 1978, at 91,
reveals the magnitude of recent tender offers:
In general, the targets are a lot bigger than they used to be. Six of last year's
takeovers came to $300 million or more. Two of them-J. Ray McDermott's acquisition
of Babcock & Wilcox and Kennecott Copper's purchase of Carborundum-cost more
than $500 million, and Unilever paid $482 million for National Starch.
Id.
14. See notes 38-48 infra and accompanying text.
15. See Part 11(A) infra.
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constraints. Target directors must consider not only their responsi-
bilities to their own shareholders but also the content of the offeror's
proposal and the economic impact of the offer's success on the cor-
poration and on their own position."
A. Tender Offer Mechanics
Although the form of a tender offer varies according to the
interests of the offeror, the offeror's capability to consummate the
transaction, and the resistance expected from the target, 7 recent
tender offers have tended to fit a flexible mold. The potential of-
feror, for various reasons,' 8 offers to purchase control of a target
company either for cash, for exchange of its own securities, or for a
combination of both." A solicited target typically has widespread
ownership with no significant concentration of ownership in any
single individual or in the management group. 20 Ordinarily, the tar-
get has a successful recent earnings record-earnings per share and
book value usually are high-but the target's stock has been trading
at a low price/earnings ratio and at or below book value.2 Most
16. See Parts ffl(B)-(C) infra.
17. The offeror may be interested simply in gaining voting control, in which case it will
seek to purchase only a significantly large share of the target to exercise control. Alternatively,
the offeror might wish to merge with the target after the offer, in which case it must obtain a
very large percentage of the target's outstanding shares. The tactic used by the offeror will
depend on the offeror's ultimate objective-if it wants only voting control, it will consider
open-market purchases; if it desires sufficient ownership to force a merger, it probably must
publicly announce its intention to purchase any and'all shares at a substantial premium. See,
e.g., TENDER OFFERs, supra note 1, at 38; Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate Acquisition by
Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 317 (1967).
18. Ordinarily the offeror seeks to diversify its production by the addition of a target
company operating in an industry that complements the other industries in which the offeror
is engaged. Alternatively, the offeror may simply desire to add a profitable subsidiary to
enhance its own sluggish performance. See Note, supra note 6, at 993.
19. See notes 25-30 infra and accompanying text. See also TENDER OFFERS, supra note
1, at 29.
20. A target company with widespread stock ownership and without significant hold-
ings in any single individual or management should be easiest to obtain by tender offer
because diverse owners ordinarily seek only to obtain the highest investment return and thus
are more receptive to a "premium" offer. See Fleischer, Disclosure Problems in Tender Offers
and Freezeouts: General Disclosure Principles, 32 Bus. LAW. 1365 (1977); Troubh, supra note
5, at 1301. Moreover, if a target company is comprised of a widespread and diverse share-
holder group, these shareholders typically have no geographical or corporate ties and conse-
quently would be more likely to tender their shares when offered a premium. See TENDER
OFFERS, supra note 1, at 6.
21. A potential target company with a low price/earnings ratio may be acquired for a
relatively low offering price in relation to present and projected earnings. For an example of
how acquisitions of a low multiple offeror by means of an exchange offer can increase the
offeror's earnings per share, see TENDER OFFERS, supra note 1, at 3. See also Troubh, supra
note 5, at 1302. One commentator notes that, contrary to common belief, most target shares
purchased during a tender offer were selling above rather than below book value at the date
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important, however, an offeror will seek a target company with weak
or arrogant management who maintain poor stockholder relations. 22
Other target characteristics considered important by an offeror in-
clude low debt ratio, recent large capital expenditures through cash
flow, and substantial liquid assets in excess of that needed for opera-
tions."
Once a potential offeror selects a target company, it must
choose a form and price for the offer. 24 A cash offer provides several
advantages. Investors readily can interpret the investment impact
of a cash offer. Moreover, in contrast to an exchange offer, a cash
offer relieves the offeror of the necessity of convincing target share-
holders that they should accept the offeror's stock in exchange for
their target shares.21 If the offeror cannot finance a cash offer, or if
the offeror's securities appear especially appealing to the investing
public, the offeror might attempt an exchange offer of its common
or preferred stock, convertible or nonconvertible debentures, bonds,
or warrants. Alternatively, the offeror may consider combining both
a cash and equity exchange offer.2 1
Selection of the offering price probably represents the most
important and most difficult planning decision the offeror must
make. A premium, or cash value above the target stock's market
value, should be offered to enhance the tender offer's chances for
success. In setting the tender offer price, the offeror must consider
the value of the target company, the target company's current mar-
ket share price, current market conditions, the number of outstand-
ing target shares, and the likelihood that target management will
of the tender offer. Merjos, Takeover Targets: They Share, an Analysis Reveals, a Good Deal
in Common, BARRONS, May 15, 1978, at 9.
22. See TENDER OFFER, supra note 1, at 9; Troubh, supra note 5, at 1301.
23. For discussion and empirical analysis of target company characteristics, see D.
AusTIN & J. FISHMAN, CoRPoaATIONs IN CONFLIcT-THE TENDER OFFER (1970); Hayes & Taus-
sig, Tactics of Cash Takeover Bids, HARv. Bus. REv., MAR.-APR. 1967, at 135: 20 ME. L. REV.
237 (1965).
24. Quite often, the offeror will acquire a relatively large initial block of the target's
stock before announcing its tender offer in order to provide a base from which to attempt the
takeover. TENDER OFFERS, supra note 1, at 19. If the offeror obtains more than 5% of the
target's outstanding equity securities, however, it must report this ownership to the SEC,
thereby revealing its position. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1976); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1978);
TENDER OFFERS, supra note 1, at 19. Accordingly, the offeror may announce a public tender
offer without previously acquiring any target shares and utilize the advantage of surprise.
25. See TENDER OFFERS, supra note 1, at 29-30. See also INSTITUTIONAL INvESTOR STUDY
REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. Doc. No. 64, pt. 5, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. 2833 (1971) [hereinafter cited as INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY].
26. The effect of an exchange offer is to dilute ownership in the hands of existing offeror
shareholders. Therefore the use of debt securities and combination debt and cash offerings
reduces this dilution. See TENDER OFFERS, supra note 1, at 30.
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resist the offer.Y
Once the offeror sets the form and price of the offer, it might
seek to obtain control of the target through the use of one or a
combination of several tender offer strategies. For example, the of-
feror might engage in a concerted program of individual open mar-
ket purchases at market prices," an active but private solicitation
of preselected shareholders, 29 or a conventional public tender offer
announcement to purchase a specific number of shares, either on a
first-come, first-served or pro-rata basis." Typically, the offeror will
reserve the right to refuse to purchase any shares if less than the
desired number of shares required to obtain control are tendered.,
Any shareholder desiring to tender shares must follow the offeror's
specific instructions, which usually provide for the deposit of ten-
dered shares with the offeror's designated depositary or forwarding
agent.32 Any -shares not accepted are returned to the tendering
shareholder.33
Each tender offer strategy, whether pursued independently or
in combination with other strategies, imposes upon the solicited
public shareholder an investment decision; the shareholder must
decide to sell or not to sell. The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
expressly refused to define the term "tender offer."3 Under interpre-
tive case law, however, whether a purchase strategy constitutes a
tender offer, as opposed to an unregulated open market purchase,
depends on the amount of selling pressure exerted by the offeror. 5
27. Furthermore, the offeror must consider the percentage ownership that it wishes to
obtain in the target. Obviously, the greater percentage the offeror seeks, the higher the
premium must be to persuade a sufficient number of shareholders to tender. See Greenhill,
supra note 4, at 1307-08 (1977). See generally, TENDER OFFERS, supra note 1, at 38-41; Hayes
& Taussig, supra note 23, at 135.
28. An offeror frequently will utilize this method to gain a base for a later conventional
public tender offer. See hote 24 supra. For an example of the combined use of private and
public tender offer strategies, see Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
29. In an interesting variation on this strategy, an offeror might solicit a friendly institu-
tional investor to acquire a large equity ownership in the target. See INsTrruriONAL INvESTOR
STUDY, supra note 25, at 2835; TENDER OFFERS, supra note 1, at 25.
30. Section 14(d)(6) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, requires that if an
offeror solicits less than all outstanding target shares and more shares than the offeror sought
are deposited within 10 days, the offeror must purchase a pro-rata number of shares from
every tendering shareholder. If less than the solicited number of shares are tendered, the
offeror may purchase any or all of those tendered, on a first-come, first-served basis. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(d)(6) (1976).
31. TENDER OFFERs, supra note 1, at 48-49; Note, supra note 6, at 993.
32. TENDER OFFERS, supra note 1, at 59.
33. Id. at 50.
34. See DEVELOPMENTs IN TENDER OFFERS, supra note 13, at 1.
35. Id. at 1-25; Einhorn & Blackburn, The Developing Concept of "Tender Offer:" An
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If the offeror contacts individual shareholders personally, or an-
nounces publicly its intent to purchase a large block, a court proba-
bly would construe the solicitation as a tender offer because sub-
stantial selling pressure exists." Nevertheless, a program of public
purchases at market prices might also constitute a tender offer if
any individual purchase is so large that selling pressure results.3 1
Since both federal and state laws intend to reach a broad range of
fraudulent and unfair securities activity, any solicitation deter-
mined to be a tender offer under federal law also should constitute
a tender offer for purposes of state court scrutiny of directors' con-
duct.
B. Tender Offer Defense Strategies
(1) The Maturation of Defense Tactics
Once target directors recognize a potential or actual tender
offer and make a decision to resist, they may utilize many alterna-
tive defense tactics. The choice of defense tactics depends in part
on the target's position and in part on the stance taken by the
offeror."5 The various tactics available may be divided into two cate-
gories: those designed to dissuade existing shareholders from selling
and those designed to dissuade the offeror from buying.39 Further-
more, target directors may implement tactics in either category
before a potential offer or during the pendency of an actual offer."
The surge of takeover activity in the 1960's produced a great
number of lawsuits testing the usefulness of individual defense tac-
tics" and afforded directors and commentators an opportunity to
Analysis of the Judicial and Administrative Interpretations of the Term, 23 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 379 (1978).
36. Id. See, e.g., Cattlemen's Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
37. See Lipton, Open Market Purchases, 32 Bus. LAW. 1321 (1977). This proposition was
raised in D-Z Inv. Co. v. Hollaway, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
94,771 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), but most courts have rejected it. See Einhorn & Blackburn, supra
note 35, at 380-81.
38. See, e.g., TENDER OFFERS, supra note 1, at 234-76.
39. Tactics such as maintaining shareholder relations are designed to dissuade target
shareholders from selling. Instituting an antitrust action against the offeror obviously is
designed to dissuade that offeror from buying. Id.
40. The tactics discussed in both TENDER OFFERS, supra note 1, at 234, and
DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERs, supra note 13, at 193, are categorized as implemented
before or during a pending tender offer.
41. For example, numerous suits involving allegations that a tender offeror's proposed
purchase violates federal antitrust laws have established specific guidelines defining when a
court will enjoin a tender offer as potentially violative of antitrust prohibitions. See
DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS, supra note 13, at 147-60. Consequently, target directors now
have a wealth of case law upon which they may draw in deciding whether to file an antitrust
action to enjoin a proposed tender offer.
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consider and develop further imaginative defense strategies. 2 From
this experience emerged a number of complex preoffer strategies
such as the "shark-repellent" amendment of a corporation's articles
of incorporation," reincorporation in states with antitakeover stat-
utes," and establishment of employee stock ownership plans." Com-
mon defense tactics used during the pendency of a tender offer
include the solicitation of a "white knight" or friendly offeror who
will compete with the hostile offeror either to drive up the bid price
or to defeat the hostile offer altogether," the institution of litigation
against the offeror alleging violation of a number of state or federal
laws," and publicity campaigns designed to dissuade target share-
holders from tendering their shares.4
A frequently used defense tactic that now faces potential invali-
dation is a target's utilization of state tender offer statutes to delay
a pending offer, which provides target management with an oppor-
tunity to mount a more concerted defense strategy." Most state
tender offer statutes presently require the offeror to notify the target
prior to announcing the offer and to wait a period of from ten to sixty
days before consummating the purchase. 0 Because state tender
42. See notes 43-48 infra and accompanying text.
43. A potential target that fears the consequences of a tender offer might dissuade a
prospective offeror from offering to purchase its shares by amending its articles of incorpora-
tion to require an 80% target shareholder vote before a subsequent merger between the target
and offeror could be transacted. See Buford, Amending the Corporate Charter, 32 Bus. LAW.
1353 (1977).
44. See notes 49-53 infra and accompanying text.
45. An employee stock ownership plan obviously fosters some shareholder loyalty to the
target and thereby reduces the probability that a tender offer might succeed. See
DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS, supra note 13, at 197-99.
46. For a frightening indication of the pitfalls involved in soliciting a friendly defensive
merger, see Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 516 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1975), rev'd, 430
U.S. 1 (1977).
47. Target companies often bring suit against an offeror immediately after a tender offer
proposal, alleging that the tender offer violates federal securities laws, state tender offer laws,
antitrust restrictions, or various other federal statutes such as the Atomic Energy Act. See,
e.g., Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. United Technologies Corp., 435 F. Supp. 1249, 1288-89 (N.D.
Ohio 1977).
48. An excellent public relations campaign designed to inform target shareholders fre-
quently that their directors are looking after shareholder interests decreases the probability
that a tender offeror will receive a block of target shares sufficiently large to give the offeror
absolute control. When accompanied by a dividend reinvestment plan, this strategy attracts
long-term shareholders who would be reluctant to tender. See Robinson, Strategy to Prevent
a Tender Offer, 32 Bus. LAw. 1301, 1362 (1977).
49. This tactic is illustrated in the discussion of the impact of state tender offer statutes
on the bids for Copperweld Corporation, Otis Elevator Company, and Youngstown Steel Door
Company in DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS, supra note 13, at 220-25.
50. For example, Virginia requires a waiting period of 60 days. VA. CODE § 13.1-531(a)
(Supp. 1977). See also, Gould & Jacobs, The Practical Effects of State Tender Offer
Legislation, 23 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 399, 409 (1978); Nathan & Moloney, State Tender Offer
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offer statutes assert broad jurisdiction, most offerors now must file
extensive information with one or more state administrative agen-
cies and potentially wait the longest applicable waiting period be-
fore proceeding with their offer.-' Moreover, several states require a
hearing to consider the offer's merits when requested by target man-
agement.12 During this waiting period, target directors are free to
consider the catalogue of defense tactics. In fact, defense tactics
whose success depended in part on the time delay provided by state
law have defeated several substantial tender offers.-"
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Great Western United Corp. v.
Kidwell,5 1 however, probably renders unconstitutional many state
tender offer statutes. In Kidwell, Great Western sought review of the
application of Idaho's takeover statute to its tender offer bid for the
controlling interest in Sunshine Mining and Metal Company."
Great Western alleged that the Idaho statute, as applied, consti-
tuted an impermissible burden on interstate commerce and that the
Williams Act preempted the Idaho statute."
The Fifth Circuit agreed with both allegations, finding that the
market approach to investor protection adopted by Congress in the
Williams Act preempted the fiduciary approach adopted by Idaho
in its takeover statute. According to the court, the Williams Act
preserved a neutral regulatory stance by providing individual share-
holders with sufficient information to evaluate a tender offer by
requiring full disclosure of relevant information by both the offeror
and target management. Conversely, the Idaho statute permitted
target management unilaterally to delay the tender offer by invok-
Statutes: An Analysis of the Practical and Policy Considerations, 23 N.Y.L. Sca. L. REv. 647,
658-59 (1978).
51. See, e.g., Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978)
(Great Western's tender offer bid for Sunshine Mining and Metal Company potentially came
under the tender offer jurisdictions of Idaho, New York, and Maryland). See notes 54, 59
infra and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 30-1503(4) (Supp. 1977); Nathan & Moloney, supra note 50,
at 663.
53. See note 49 supra.
54. 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978).
55. Great Western announced its decision to purchase 2,000,000 shares of Sunshine's
common stock on March 21, 1977. Idaho thereafter asserted that Great Western's tender offer
fell under the jurisdiction of Idaho's takeover statute. Great Western, potentially faced with
having to comply with conflicting requirements of the New York and Maryland takeover
statutes, filed suit seeking an order declaring all three statutes invalid as applied to Great
Western's offer. The federal district court dismissed the claim against New York and Mary-
land and found the Idaho statute unconstitutional. Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell,
439 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Tex. 1977). Thereafter, Great Western consummated its acquisition,
but because Idaho could seek an injunction or require rescission if the appellate court re-
versed, the issue was not moot. 577 F.2d at 1264-65.
56. 577 F.2d at 1264.
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ing a hearing before the director of the Idaho Department of Finance
and thereby postponing the offer until receipt of state approval."
The court thereby concluded that the Idaho statute constituted a
fiduciary approach to investor protection that denied investors their
individual choice. Thus the court held the Idaho statute incompati-
ble with the Williams Act. Further, the court held that since the
statute permitted the state director of finance unilaterally to block
a thirty-one million dollar tender offer, the statute constituted an
impermissible burden on interstate commerce. 8 According to the
court, the burdens this statute imposed on the free flow of interstate
commerce were disproportionate to the statute's legitimate benefit
of protecting Idaho investors."
The conclusion reached in Kidwell inevitably sounds the death
knell for other overbroad state tender offer statutes.'" Congress,
however, previously had adopted the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act," which requires notification to both the Justice
Department and the Federal Trade Commission of any substantial
tender offer." Although an offeror may announce its tender offer
prior to notifying these departments, according to recent rules pre-
scribed by the FTC," it will have to wait a mandatory fifteen days
to complete a cash offer and thirty days to complete an exchange
offer," which gives target companies an extended period during
which to consider defense strategies." Moreover, the Act grants both
57. IDAHO CODE § 30-1503(4) (Supp. 1977) provides:
A take-over offer becomes effective when approved by the director [of finance]. The
director may call a hearing if he deems it necessary or appropriate for the protection of
offerees in this state, and shall call a hearing if so requested by the target company,
acting through its board of directors.
58. 577 F.2d at 1284.
59. Id. at 1286.
60. Although the Idaho statute is especially overreaching, the legal standards applied
by the Fifth Circuit undoubtedly would also render unconstitutional most other state tender
offer statutes that permit offeror management unilaterally to invoke a hearing before a state
commission. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
61. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1976).
62. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act requires prior notification by
both parties to the Justice Department and the FTC of any acquisition in which a company
with more than $10 million in net annual sales or total assets is being acquired by another
company with more than $100 million in net annual sales or total assets when, as a result of
the acquisition, the acquirer will hold 15% or more of the voting securities or assets of the
acquired company. Id.
63. 16 C.F.R. §§ 801-803 (1978).
64. 16 C.F.R. § 803.10 (1978).
65. According to tender offer authorities Martin Lipton and Joseph Flom, the waiting
periods required by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act will be applied more
fairly than state waiting periods and will not significantly slow down the frequency of tender
offers. NAT'L L. J., Oct. 30, 1978, at 6, col. 2.
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the Justice Department and the FTC power to extend these waiting
periods by requesting further disclosure by the offeror."5 Thus, al-
though Kidwell probably renders unconstitutional many state take-
over statutes, the FTC's promulgation of waiting period rules under
the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act allows target
management at least fifteen days to consider and implement var-
ious defense strategies. This waiting period presents a problem to a
target company that seeks a "white knight" offeror, however, be-
cause, once selected, the "white knight" must wait a second, inde-
pendent period during which the original offeror might consummate
its offer.
The variety of complex and tested strategies available to target
directors encourages their implementation when those directors face
a potentially hostile tender offer. Moreover, the time delays avail-
able to target directors greatly enhance the ultimate likelihood of a
strategy's success. Even though target directors have faced a recent
surge of shareholder suits for successfully maintaining defense ac-
tions," because of the defense strategies' probability of success and
the directors' potential loss of control of the target company, the
temptation to defend nevertheless remains.
(2) The Director's Dilemma
Whenever a target director chooses to resist and successfully
defends against a tender offer, that action may result in the target
shareholders' loss of an opportunity to tender their shares for a price
higher than the prevailing market price and in a subsequent share-
holder suit alleging corporate mismanagement as the cause of that
loss." Since the majority of mismanagement claims now must be
brought under state law," the allegation of mismanagement typi-
cally will allege that the target directors acted in bad faith and for
their personal interests in defending the tender offer, violating their
fiduciary obligations to the target shareholders." The dilemma fac-
ing target directors arises because, once faced with the defense deci-
sion, the directors must consider both the preservation of their own
positions and the fiduciary obligations they owe to target sharehold-
66. 16 C.F.R. § 803.20 (1978).
67. See Green, Two-Front Wars-Some Firms Fighting Tender Offers Provoke Suits by
Own Holders, Wall St. J., Aug. 3, 1977, at 1, col. 1. See also Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co.,
454 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978); Reeves v. Texas Gulf, Inc., 78 Misc. 2d 579, 357
N.Y.S.2d 662 (1974).
68. See, e.g., Reeves v. Texas Gulf, Inc., 78 Misc. 2d 579, 357 N.Y.S.2d 662 (1974).
69. See notes 81-88 infra and accompanying text.
70. See notes 89-95 infra and accompanying text.
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ers. Implicit in every decision to resist a tender offer is the target
directors' determination either that the target company will operate
at least as profitably as an autonomous enterprise under their own
control or that they desire to maintain control of the target even
though the offeror may operate the target more profitably." Imple-
menting the defense decision for either purpose furthers the direc-
tors' individual interests insofar as the successful resistance perpet-
uates their control. Since most state fiduciary standards test mana-
gerial decisions upon the degree of self-dealing and bad faith in-
volved in a decision,7 2 a director's avoidance of personal liability
largely depends on a court's resolution of the issue of self-serving
motivation. Thus to refrain from imposing liability upon target
directors, a court must be convinced that although the directors'
resistance of the tender offer preserved those directors' positions, it
also satisfied fiduciary obligations owed by the directors to their
shareholders.
III. LEGAL LIMITATIONS ON A TARGET DIRECTOR'S
CAPACITY To RESIST A TENDER OFFER
A. The Federal Attempt
In response to mounting complaints that target shareholders
were receiving very little information about the tender offeror upon
which they might base an informed investment decision, Congress
in 1968 enacted the Williams Act 73 as an amendment to the Securi-
ties and Exchange Act of 1934.71 This amendment requires detailed
disclosure by any person making a solicitation or recommendation
to accept or reject a tender offer.75 Section 14(e) imposes liability on
any person making an untrue statement of material fact or engaging
in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative act or practice in
connection with the invitation for tenders or the recommendation
that shareholders oppose or favor any tender offer.76 Thus the Wil-
71. Even if present directors are assured that they will retain their positions over their
corporation as a subsidiary of the offeror after the purchase, directors often do not desire to
report to anyone other than themselves. For example, the president of Microdot Inc. acceded
to a purchase of Microdot by Northwest Industries on the promise that he would retain his
position. He later quit however, stating that he "wasn't used to having a boss." See Metz,
Inevitable Escalation of Corporate Takeovers, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 20, 1978, at 19, col. 1.
72. See text accompanying notes 89-95 infra.
73. 15 U.S.C. H§ 78m (d)-(e), 78n (d)-(f) (1976).
74. 15 U.S.C. H§ 78a-78kk (1976).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976).
76. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976) provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material fact
or to omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or to engage
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liams Act attempts to insure truth in disclosure not only from the
offeror, but also from target directors who recommend that share-
holders oppose or favor the pending offer."
Subsequent to the enactment of the Williams Act, target share-
holders utilized its antifraud provisions as a basis for lawsuits seek-
ing damages from the target's directors for "fraudulently" dissuad-
ing shareholders from tendering their shares.78 Several problems
exist, however, in applying section 14(e) to target directors' action
designed to defeat a potential or pending tender offer. For example,
it is unclear whether defensive action taken prior to a tender offer
announcement constitutes fraud "in connection with a tender
offer." 7 Although this question has not been litigated specifically in
the context of a shareholder suit against target directors for institut-
ing defensive tactics, the question should be resolved in favor of
allowing a cause of action to further the Williams Act's goal of
truthful disclosure.80 A second and more important question is
whether a target company's institution of defensive tactics consti-
tutes a fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative practice and thus
allows target shareholders to bring suit when the target's directors
neither recommended that shareholders oppose the offer nor com-
municated with shareholders in any other way.
The federal district court for the Southern District of New York
considered this question in Altman v. Knight' and concluded that
allegations constituting only a claim of corporate mismanagement
or breach of fiduciary duty cannot be brought under section 14(e) .82
In Altman the target company's directors, faced with a pending
in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any
tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security holders in
opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request, or invitation.
77. Target management may inform target shareholders that an offer is pending, that
target directors are considering the offer, and that shareholders should not act until they
receive management's recommendation. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(f) (1978).
78. See, e.g., Neuman v. Electronic Specialty Co., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 92,591 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
79. Recent cases suggest that if there is some public acknowledgement of a forthcoming
tender offer, any target action taken in defense might be construed as "in connection with a
tender offer." See Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., [1976-1977 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 95,824 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). When directors take defensive
action, however, merely to prevent the possibility of a takeover, jurisdiction of § 14(e) over
that action may not exist.
80. Whenever target management seeks shareholder approval of any corporate change
designed surreptitiously to insulate the target from a potential takeover attempt, target
shareholders may be harmed in the same manner as if their directors acted unilaterally to
defend a pending tender offer. Therefore, disclosure of management's true purposes for insti-
tuting preoffer defense tactics should be compelled.
81. 431 F. Supp. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
82. Id. at 314.
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tender offer, approved the purchase of a third company, thereby
causing the tender offeror to withdraw its offer." The target com-
pany's shareholders subsequently brought suit alleging that the
price paid for the third company was excessive and that the target
directors approved the purchase solely to block the tender offer and
to perpetuate their own control." Finding that the shareholders'
claim amounted to no more than an allegation that the target direc-
tors breached their fiduciary duties, the court rejected the applica-
tion of section 14(e), concluding that this was "precisely the kind
of claim the Supreme Court [in Santa Fe Industries v. Green] felt
should be decided under state law.""* In addition, the court ruled
that even if directors make a misstatement of fact in connection
with implementation of defense tactics, no cause of action will arise
unless that misstatement caused the shareholders' injuries." If the
decision to implement defense tactics does not require shareholder
approval and the directors act solely to discourage the offeror rather
than to dissuade their own shareholders, it is the act of implement-
ing defensive tactics and not any accompanying misstatement or
omission that causes the shareholders' harm. 7 Thus the court con-
cluded that a shareholder action alleging that their loss was caused
by the act of defending a tender offer, and not by any accompanying
misstatement, states a claim only under state law." Therefore most
future shareholder claims against target directors for resisting a
tender offer will have to be brought in state court alleging only
causes of action under state law, unless other facts support the
shareholders' allegations of fraud.
83. Anaconda Company, during the course of a tender offer by Crane Company to
purchase Anaconda shares, negotiated the purchase of Walworth Company. Anaconda
thereby deprived its shareholders of the opportunity to tender their shares to Crane. Id. at
311.
84. Plaintiffs, shareholders in the Anaconda Company, brought suit against Anaconda,
alleging that it purchased Walworth Company solely to block a tender offer for Anaconda
shares by Crane Company, and not for any other valid business purpose. Id.
85. Citing Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), the court concluded that even
if Anaconda's purchase of Walworth furthered no valid business purpose, that alone would
not constitute a manipulative or deceptive device as required by § 14(e). The court thus held
that since the shareholders had alleged only that the terms of the transaction were unfair,
without alleging Anaconda's failure to disclose fully and fairly the transaction's circumstan-
ces, no federal claim existed. 431 F. Supp. at 313-14.
86. 431 F. Supp. at 314.
87. According to the court, since Anaconda's purchase of Walworth required no prior
shareholder approval, any loss that shareholders could prove resulted from the directors'
actions in transacting the purchase and not from any accompanying misstatement to share-
holders. Id.
88. Id.
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B. State Governance of Corporate Directors' Responsibilities
Once corporate directors are entrusted with the investing pub-
lic's funds, state law imposes a duty upon those directors to manage
the corporation's affairs with care and loyalty." Although techni-
cally not trustees, corporate directors stand in a fiduciary relation-
ship with the corporation and its shareholders and have affirmative
duties to protect the interests of both." Traditional corporate legal
standards, however, permit directors to exercise substantial discre-
tion in rendering daily business decisions without fear of judicial
interference at the insistence of dissatisfied shareholders." This lati-
tude of business judgment prevails as long as directors administer
the corporation's affairs in good faith and in the shareholders' best
interests. In theory, this "business judgment" doctrine reflects a
judicial policy that noninterference with directors' corporate deci-
sions will encourage endeavor in high-risk ventures that, if success-
ful, benefit society as a whole." Consequently, courts will not com-
pensate aggrieved shareholders for losses resulting from questiona-
ble director decisions, however unlikely the decisions' chances of
success might have been at the time they were made. This tradi-
tional presumption of proper business judgment is overcome only by
affirmative shareholder proof that management acted contrary to
the corporation or shareholders' best interests and in furtherance of
selfish interests." Shareholder proof of the directors' selfish inter-
ests, however, is an especially rigorous burden because this motiva-
tion rarely is admitted and must be proved affirmatively by circum-
stantial evidence." Accordingly, application of the business judg-
ment rule in most contexts results in a favorable decision for corpo-
rate directors. 5
89. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 713 (McKinney 1970); ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP.
Acr § 35 (rev. ed. 1975).
90. For a classic statement of a director's fiduciary obligations, see Guth v. Loft, Inc.,
23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1939), in which the court stated:
Corporate officers and directors are not permitted to use their position of trust and
confidence to further their private interests. While technically not trustees, they stand
in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockholders . . . . The rule that
requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation demands that there shall
be no conflict between duty and self-interest.
Id. at 270, 5 A.2d at 510.
91. See Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132 (1891); 4 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE
LAw OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONs, § 1039 (rev. perm. ed. 1975).
92. See Note, The Continuing Vitality of the Business Judgment Rule as a Guide for
Judicial Restraint, 35 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 562, 565 (1967).
93. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
94. See 70 YALE L.J. 308, 319 (1960).
95. See Note, 57 VA. L. REV. 1223, 1230 (1971) ("The business judgment test, therefore,
seems to reflect a judicial predilection to decide in favor of the defendant . . . .").
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(1) Berman v. Gerber Products Co.
Application of traditional corporate legal standards to share-
holder claims alleging that a director breached his fiduciary duty by
resisting a tender offer proposal fails to afford meaningful judicial
scrutiny into whether the directors acted in good faith and in the
best interests of the corporation and the shareholders. The recent
opinion in Berman v. Gerber Products Co." amply illustrates this
point. In Berman shareholders of Gerber alleged that Gerber's direc-
tors violated federal and state law" by instituting legal proceedings
that resulted in Anderson, Clayton & Co.'s withdrawal of a tender
offer to purchase any and all outstanding Gerber common shares."
Noting that after Altman the claim no longer was cognizable under
the federal securities' antifraud laws, the court stated, in dicta, that
even if the claim were cognizable, Michigan law, which follows the
business judgment rule, would not hold the directors liable for good
faith errors in judgment." Although the Gerber court was not re-
quired to render a binding determination of this state law issue, it
concluded, without analysis of whether Gerber's directors acted for
their own interests, that the business judgment rule protected the
directors from liability for their decision to defend. Thus the Gerber
court's dicta represents the cursory resolution achievable by appli-
cation of the business judgment presumption. The court's analysis
ignored the conflict of interests facing Gerber's directors and failed
to require any proof by the directors of their good faith, care, and
loyalty in deciding to defend against the tender offer.
(2) Cheff v. Mathes
In Cheff v. Mathes, 101 a shareholder action against a target com-
pany's directors alleging improper use of corporate funds to pur-
chase all target sh'ares owned by the offeror, the Delaware Supreme
96. 454 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
97. Plaintiffs, shareholders of Gerber, alleged that Gerber violated section 14(e) of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976), as well as common law
principles of fiduciary duty. 454 F. Supp. at 1316.
98. On April 18, 1977, Anderson, Clayton & Company publicly announced its intention
to purchase through a cash tender offer any and all of the outstanding shares of Gerber
common stock. On April 25, Gerber's directors issued a press release recommending that its
shareholders reject the offer. On the same day, Gerber filed suit seeking to enjoin the offer.
On September 19, 1977, Anderson, Clayton announced that it was withdrawing its tender
offer. Id. at 1314-16.
99. Citing Thomas v. Satfield Co., 363 Mich. 111, 108 N.W.2d 907 (1961), for the
proposition that Michigan law clearly scrutinizes a director's dealings with his stockholders,
the court nevertheless concluded that management may not be held liable for good faith
errors in judgment. Id. at 1319.
100. 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
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Court refused to apply the business judgment standard, focusing
instead on the question of the target directors' self-dealing. In Cheff,
Motor Products Corporation, through its chairman, Maremont, en-
gaged in a series of open-market purchases that ultimately gave
Maremont controlling interest in the Holland Furnace Company.101
Maremont subsequently demanded a position on Holland's board of
directors and expressed an opinion that Holland's distribution sys-
tem was obsolete.' Rather than concede to Maremont's demands,
Holland's directors negotiated the purchase of Maremont's entire
interest in Holland with corporate funds,"o' ostensibly for the pur-
pose of implementing a stock option plan."0 ' Thereafter, several of
Holland's minority shareholders brought suit alleging that the
directors had used corporate funds solely to perpetuate their own
control. n0s
The lower Delaware court found that Maremont's impending
control posed no real threat to Holland, that the asserted stock
option plan was an insufficient rationale to support the directors'
action, and that the directors' actual motive for the purchase was
their desire to perpetuate their own control.0 ' On appeal, the Dela-
ware Supreme Court reversed, holding that Holland's directors en-
gaged in a reasonable investigation into Maremont's background
and that the results of that investigation, together with considera-
tion of Maremont's express discontent with Holland's distribution
system, justified their belief that Maremont posed a threat to Hol-
land's continued existence.o'0 In reaching this conclusion, however,
101. Between early 1957 and October 1957, Maremont, through a series of open-market
purchases, acquired 155,000 shares of Holland Furnace.
102. According to the testimony of Cheff, Holland's Chief Executive Officer, Mare-
mont, upon demanding a position on Holland's board, "indicated immediately that he had
no interest in [Holland's] type of distribution, that he didn't think it was modern, that he
felt furnaces could be sold as she sold mufflers, through half a dozen salesmen in a wholesale
way." 41 Del. Ch. at 500, 199 A.2d at 551.
103. Id. at 501, 199 A.2d at 552.
104. On August 30, 1957, after Maremont demanded a position on Holland's board,
Holland's directors authorized the purchase of company stock on the open market with
corporate funds for use in a stock option plan. In fact, the stock option plan never was
implemented. Id. at 501-03, 199 A.2d at 552-53.
105. Plaintiffs, owners of 60 Holland shares, filed a derivative action naming all of
Holland's individual directors and Holland itself as defendants. Id. at 502, 199 A.2d at 553.
106. Id.
107. Emphasizing that Holland's directors were held only to a standard of good faith
and reasonable investigation, the court concluded that because unrebutted testimony indi-
cated that the directors first received advice from Dun and Bradstreet indicating that Mare-
mont had liquidated past corporations, second, received professional financial advice recom-
mending that Holland purchase Motor Products, and third, from personal investigation un-
covered Maremont's alleged poor reputation, the directors were justified in transacting the
purchase with corporate funds. Id. at 507, 199 A.2d at 556.
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the Cheff court expressly shifted to the directors the burden of justi-
fying the corporate action as being primarily in the corporation's
best interests.0 8 Citing Bennett v. Propp,1on the court noted that
since use of corporate funds by directors to defeat a takeover at-
tempt necessarily perpetuates the directors' control, directors face
a conflict of interests and should bear the burden of proving the
propriety of their actions. The court found, however, that Holland's
directors had satisfied this burden by proving a reasonable investi-
gation, the results of which supported their good faith belief that
Maremont's takeover would threaten corporate policy.1n0
Although Cheff was not a shareholder action contesting the
validity of a target director's defense action that resulted in the
shareholders' loss of a tender option, it represents an analysis of a
shareholder's complaint that target directors acted unilaterally to
preserve their directorate status at the expense of the shareholders.
Since target shareholders who lose a tender option as a result of
unilateral directorate action similarly contend that management
acted without shareholder approval to perpetuate their own power,
the Cheff analysis is appropriate in the tender offer context. This
analysis recognizes the inherent conflict of interests facing target
directors who desire to defeat a takeover attempt and, rather than
resolving the conflict through cursory application of the business
judgment presumption, shifts the burden to the directors to prove
that the defense action furthered the corporation's best interests.
(3) Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co.
In Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co.,'" a Delaware chancery
court decision subsequent to Cheff, the court refused to apply the
burden of proof shift mandated by Cheff, but nonetheless required
a higher substantive showing on the part of the directors. In Condec
the Lunkenheimer directors, in response to Condec's proposal to
purchase an outstanding portion of Lunkenheimer common stock,"'
108. Id. at 504, 199 A.2d at 554.
109. 41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405 (Sup. Ct. 1962). In Bennett, Sadacca, chairman of
the board of Noma Lites, Inc., arranged for the open market purchase of Noma shares in an
attempt to defeat a threat by Textron Inc. to purchase over 50% of Noma's outstanding stock.
After failing to secure personal financing to consummate the purchase, Sadacca influenced
Noma's board of directors to adopt the purchase in the corporate name. Noting that directors
who utilize corporate funds to remove a threat to corporate policy are confronted with a
conflict of interests, the court shifted the burden to Sadacca and Noma's directors to justify
the stock purchase as transacted primarily in the corporate interest. Id. at 22, 187 A.2d at
409.
110. See note 107 supra.
111. 43 Del. Ch. 353, 230 A.2d 769 (Ch. 1967).
112. After Lunkenheimer rejected Condec's proposal for a friendly merger, Condec
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authorized the issuance of 75,000 unissued Lunkenheimer shares in
exchange for 75,000 shares of U.S. Industries, Incorporated."3 Be-
cause this exchange effectively defeated Condec's takeover attempt,
Condec, which already owned a substantial block of shares, insti-
tuted a suit alleging that Lunkenheimer's directors transacted the
exchange solely to serve their personal interests and that the ex-
change was not made in the exercise of prudent judgment, or in
furtherance of any legitimate corporate purpose."4 The Delaware
chancery court noted, however, that the mere allegation of self-
dealing did not shift the burden of proof to defendants; since Condec
had not established that the directors in fact voted for their own
interests, the court did not impose upon the directors the "full bur-
den" of proving that the stock issuance was authorized in the corpo-
rate interest."5 Nevertheless, the court found that Lunkenheimer's
directors had not engaged in direct, objective investigation or pro-
fessional consultation that justifiably would lead them to believe
that the Condec takeover attempt represented a reasonable threat
to Lunkenheimer's continued existence."' Moreover, the court rea-
soned that since Condec possessed an equitable right to obtain a
controlling interest in the Lunkenheimer Company, and since the
directors' action in issuing the shares was not designed to further a
proper corporate purpose, that action constituted impermissible
corporate manipulation."'
Thus, under the Condec analysis, although a shareholder's
mere allegation of self-dealing will not shift the burden of proof to
directors to prove absence of self-dealing, a court will not summarily
dismiss a shareholder complaint on the business judgment pre-
purchased 21,000 shares of Lunkenheimer. Thereafter, on April 21, 1967, Condec announced
publicly its tender offer proposal to purchase, on a first-come, first-served basis, 190,000
additional Lunkenheimer shares. If successful, this last purchase would have given Condec
slightly more than 50% of Lunkenheimer's outstanding shares. Id. at 357, 230 A.2d at 771-
72.
113. Id. at 358, 230 A.2d at 772-73.
114. Id. at 359, 230 A.2d at 773.
115. Id. at 365, 230 A.2d at 776-77. In Cheff, however, the court shifted the burden of
proof to the directors on the mere existence of a conflict of interests. 41 Del. Ch. at 504-05,
199 A.2d at 554. Condec's requirement that plaintiffs establish self-dealing thus violates the
Cheff precedent.
116. When asked why he rejected Condec's merger proposal, Lunkenheimer's president
stated that he had investigated Condec through reports prepared by Moody's and Dun &
Bradstreet and through conversations with a financial representative at White-Weld Com-
pany, all of which revealed that Condec's debt was excessive and its profit low in relation to
sales. Nevertheless, the court deemed this investigation insufficient because it failed to reveal
any intent on Condec's part to alter Lunkenheimer or that Condec's growth rate might not
counteract poor debt and profit figures. 43 Del. Ch. at 360-65, 230 A.2d at 774-76.
117. Id. at 365-66, 230 A.2d at 777.
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sumption, but will require the directors to come forth with some
proof-first, that they investigated the offeror's intentions; second,
that this investigation revealed sufficient justification to believe
that success of the offer represented a threat to the target's contin-
ued operation; and third, if fear of such a threat was not justified,
that the directors' action furthered some other legitimate corporate
purpose."'
C. Analysis of Judicial Inconsistencies
The decisions in Gerber, Cheff, and Condec reveal the courts'
inconsistent application of fiduciary standards to a shareholder's
challenge of his directors' decision to resist a tender offer. Gerber's
application of the strict business judgment standard fails to identify
whose interests directors must further and, moreover, fails to deter-
mine whether directors acted solely or primarily to fulfill their own
interests."9 Reliance on the business judgment rule presumes that
since a director's interest in maximum profits corresponds to his
shareholders' interest in maximum return on their investment,
directors always will act to further the corporation's, and conse-
quently the shareholders', best interests. This assumption fails,
however, when applied to directors' tender offer defense decisions.
Because directors have a stake in the preservation of their indepen-
dent power, they clearly are tempted to defend against a tender offer
even though their defense decision might harm the corporation and
its shareholders.120 In this regard, the defense decision is unlike a
true business decision. Defense against a tender offer serves only to
interrupt a potential contractual relationship between the offeror
and target shareholders. Although a defense decision normally is
justified if consummation of the offer would harm both the corpora-
tion and its shareholders,I21 the fiduciary standard applied by the
118. The court in Condec implied that if the stock issuance had been authorized for
some legitimate corporate purpose such as a stock option plan, it might have passed scrutiny.
On the other hand, the court concluded that since the issuance "was obviously designed for
the primary purpose of reducing Condec's stock holdings in Lunkenheimer," it could not be
upheld. Thus the court does not conclude whether, if the issuance served some corporate
purpose but also was utilized primarily to defeat a takeover, it would pass scrutiny. Id. at
365, 230 A.2d at 777.
119. For another example of the cursory analysis resulting from application of the
business judgment standard to a director's decision to resist a tender offer, see Northwest
Indus. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
120. Because a tender offer often reflects the offeror's conclusion that present target
mismanagement is incompetent, a tender offer might provide a better opportunity for future
target growth. A target director's unilateral defense decision thus may result in the target's
loss of this growth potential. Moreover, the defense decision may also deprive target share-
holders of their investment opportunity.
121. For example, target management obviously should, and perhaps must, resist a
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courts should require that directors recognize their shareholders'
interests and act in a manner that furthers these interests. Applica-
tion of the business judgment standard compels neither a director's
recognition of nor his fulfillment of shareholder interests and conse-
quently does not sufficiently analyze applicable fiduciary responsi-
bilities.
The decision in Cheff illustrates judicial recognition that a
director's inherent selfish motives render the deferential business
judgment standard inappropriate in the tender offer defense area.
After determining that Holland's directors faced a conflict of inter-
ests in deciding to purchase Maremont's control, the Cheff court
expressly shifted to those directors the burden of proving the pro-
priety of their decision. This shifting of the burden of proof placed
emphasis on whether the directors acted in furtherance of their
fiduciary obligations. In concluding that Holland's directors met
their burden of proof by showing a reasonable belief that Maremont
posed a threat to Holland's continuity, however, the court failed to
delineate precisely whose interests conflicted with the directors' in-
terests and, moreover, whether the directors' action furthered these
conflicting interests. The court's adoption of a standard that ap-
proves the defense decision if the directors acted on a good faith
belief in a threat to the target's continuity assumes that directors
must act only to maintain the corporation's status quo to avoid
liability. A deeper underlying assumption.presumes that corporate
continuity enhances a shareholder's investment return. In fact, if
present directors are acting incompetently, a change in the corpora-
tion's status quo undoubtedly would further its shareholders' inter-
ests. Moreover, even if target directors are extremely competent,
target shareholders may not care whether corporate continuity is
maintained if the offeror presents a substantial cash offer. 2 2 Thus,
although Cheff purports to enforce the directors' fiduciary responsi-
bilities by shifting the burden of proof, its corresponding substan-
tive standard for justifying a tender offer defense decision fails to
consider whether target directors have actually protected their
shareholders' investment.
The decision in Condec cited Cheff as controlling but refused
to shift to Lunkenheimer's directors the burden of proving the pro-
priety of their decision to issue stock. Cheff's procedural standard
shifts the burden of proof upon a finding that the directors faced a
conflict of interests. As the Condec court concluded, Lunkenhei-
tender offer by a known looter announced through fraudulent representations. See, e.g.,
Northwest Indus. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
122. See also text accompanying note 156 infra.
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mer's directors acted in furtherance of their own interests. Although
declining to shift the full burden of proof to the directors, Condec
in effect applied a more rigorous standard of proof than did Cheff.
Emphasizing that Condec possessed an equitable right to control,",
the court concluded that Lunkenheimer's directors failed to demon-
strate sufficient justification for believing that Condec posed a
threat to Lunkenheimer's future continuity. Lunkenheimer's direc-
tors, however, produced evidence justifying their belief in Condec's
threat that was almost as compelling as the evidence Holland pre-
sented of Maremont's threat.124
Despite apparent inconsistencies, Condec and Cheff adopted
several analytical procedures that, if properly applied, would com-
pel directors to satisfy their fiduciary obligations. Principally, Cheff
recognized the inherent conflict of interests confronting directors
who resist a tender offer and therefore shifted to those directors the
burden of justifying their decision to defend. Condec expressly re-
jected this procedural shift but nevertheless held the target direc-
tors to a higher burden of proof by rejecting the directors' contention
that the insurgent posed a real threat to the target corporation's
continuity when in fact the evidence presented did not compel that
conclusion.1rs Both courts emphasized that directors must investi-
gate the offeror before deciding to resist a takeover attempt. If mea-
sured against the proper interests, this investigative duty would
compel target directors to fulfill their fiduciary obligations." Be-
cause both courts allow directors to consider only the corporation's
abstract interest in its own continuity, neither court forces directors
to consider their shareholders' investment interests. Since the
123. On the date Lunkenheimer agreed to authorize the issuance of 75,000 unissued
shares, Lunkenheimer shareholders had tendered a sufficient number of shares to give Condec
equitable control. 43 Del. Ch. at 357, 230 A.2d at 772.
124. The directors in both Cheff and Condec reviewed the financial background of the
respective insurgents and sought the advice of independent third party financial experts. See
notes 107 and 116 supra and accompanying text. An important distinction arises in that
Holland negotiated to purchase Maremont's control in Cheff, while the unilateral stock
issuance in Condec not only deprived Condec of control but also left Condec with a share
value substantially lower than the share value of a controlling block. Moreover, Condec, as
remaining shareholder, was the actual plaintiff in Condec, while minority shareholders insti-
tuted the Cheff suit. Nonetheless, from the standpoint of the effect of the directors' action
on shareholder interests, these distinctions are insufficient to justify differing conclusions.
125. According to the Condec court, although the record was "replete with accounting
reasons in justification of Lunkenheimer's continuing fight against Condec's [insurgent]
efforts . . . [t]here is no evidence of record that the management of Condec in the past has
either substantially altered or threatened to alter the business of any company with which it
has formed a business association . . . ." 43 Del. Ch. at 364, 230 A.2d at 776.
126. Whatever interests directors must satisfy in fulfillment of fiduciary obligations,
investigation of the offeror's price and its intentions give directors a factual basis for rendering
the defense decision.
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shareholders' investment interests often diverge from the corpora-
tion's abstract interest in its own continuity,'" the substantive fidu-
ciary standard applied in both Condec and Cheff cannot compel
directors to protect sufficiently their shareholders' interests during
the pendency of a tender offer.
IV. A PROPOSED STANDARD
A. Contemporary Notions of Corporate Responsibility
Any proposal that attempts to impose a higher standard of
responsibility upon a corporation's directors must reflect contempo-
rary notions of corporate responsibility. Since the early 1960's, the
Securities and Exchange Commission, within the boundaries of its
jurisdiction, has attempted to impose a heightened standard of re-
sponsibility upon corporate directors.'" Federal courts have re-
sponded by adopting the Commission's suggestions in many instan-
ces. Some federal courts have even prescribed a checklist standard
of conduct for directors acting under certain circumstances. 2 9 For
example, cases and commentators suggest that when a director in-
curs a duty to disclose various facts,' he cannot escape that duty
by failing to inform himself of those facts; the director must make
further inquiry.'3 ' Consequently, courts have imposed substantial
liability on directors for violations of the federal securities laws,'"32
and directors have responded by implementing decisionmaking
strategies designed to heighten their awareness, such as the in-
creased use of committees of directors primarily responsible for
overseeing corporate activity.33 Successful use of a committee sys-
tem and other devices designed to increase directors' awareness
demands a more reliable and complete flow of information upon
127. See text accompanying note 122 supra.
128. See, e.g., Sommer, Directors and the Federal Securities Laws, 241 SEC. REG. & L.
REP. (BNA) F-1 (1974) (speech before the Colorado Association of Corporate Counsel). See
also Report of Investigation in the Matter of Stirling Homex Corporation Relating to Activi-
ties of the Board of Directors of Stirling Homex Corporation, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,219.
129. See Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc) (Oakes, J.,
dissenting).
130. A duty of disclosure is imposed by 15 U.S.C. § 78(n)(e) (1976) upon any person
attempting to influence a shareholder's decision "in connection with any tender offer." See
note 76 supra and accompanying text.
131. See, e.g., Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Co., 332 F. Supp. 544 (S.D.N.Y.
1971) (director/attorney's duty to investigate).
132. See, e.g., Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 516 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1975)
(imposition of $35,800,000 damages), rev'd, 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
133. See Hahn & Manzoni, The Monitoring Committee and Outside Directors' Evolv-
ing Duty of Care, 9 Lov. Cm. L.J. 587 (1978).
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which directors may base their decisions.'? Our modem society of
passive investment and limited informational flow to investors'3
justifies continuing future emphasis on fiduciary standards de-
signed to increase informational flow to investors and to further
directorate accountability. An increasing modem fear is the corpo-
rate board of directors' capability of exercising its vast power to the
economic detriment of literally thousands of shareholders."3 Threat
of widespread liability remains an ultimate deterrent to any irre-
sponsible corporate governance. 37
Should this contemporary trend of heightened directorate re-
sponsibility extend to a director's decision to defend against a
tender offer? As previously noted, directors, as fiduciary agents, act
primarily for the benefit of their principals, the shareholders. Their
shareholders' investment return ultimately depends on the perform-
ance of the corporation and, consequently, on the competency of the
corporation's directors. In a real economic sense, all decisions that
directors make should reflect the directors' consideration of the ulti-
mate impact on the shareholders' investment. 3 Thus any decision
to resist a tender offer should reflect the directors' conclusion that
the tender offer's defeat will provide a greater investment return to
shareholders than will concession to the offer.'
An additional, compelling rationale for imposition of a higher
standard of directorate responsibility in the tender offer area is the
necessity of maintaining an unimpeded market for corporate con-
trol. In many instances, a tender offer proposal represents the of-
feror's conclusion that existing target management must be dis-
placed, or at least better organized, before the target company may
realize maximum profitability. If a target company's directors may
act unilaterally to defeat a tender offer without fear of judicially
imposed liability for failing to serve their shareholders' best inter-
ests, these directors effectively impede the market for corporate
control. Continued existence of a market for control compels a cor-
poration's directors to act to the best of their abilities in furtherance
134. Id. at 589-91.
135. See, e.g., A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
119 (1932).
136. See Sommer, Foreword: Fiduciary Duties-The Search for Content, 9 Loy. CHI.
L.J. 525 (1978).
137. Id.
138. See R. POSNER, EcoNomic ANALYSIS oF LAw § 14.5 (2d ed. 1977).
139. Essentially, this point is the premise of this Note. Fiduciary obligations arise
because shareholders entrust their funds in management's hands. The relationship is essen-
tially contractual. Id. § 14.3. Thus fiduciary standards should compel directors to consider
their shareholders' interest in investment return above all other interests. See, e.g., Guth v.
Loft, 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
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of their shareholders' interests.4 0 Imposition of a higher standard of
directorate responsibility would demand that directors act in their
shareholders', rather than their own, interests and would therefore
promote a competitive market for corporate control.
Finally, a very practical reason exists for imposing a high stan-
dard of directorate accountability in this area. In recent tender of-
fers, the premium offered to shareholders who tendered their securi-
ties has averaged eighty percent over market value and in some
instances has exceeded one hundred percent of market value."' Suc-
cessful implementation of defense tactics costs shareholders this
premium. For example, in Great Western United Corporation's bid
for Sunshine Mining and Metal Company, Sunshine defended by
instituting a suit alleging that Great Western had violated the Wil-
liams Act. When the two companies eventually settled that suit,
Great Western consummated the purchase of Sunshine shares for
seventy-five cents per share less than it had originally offered."'
Similarly, Gerber Products' successful defense of Anderson, Clayton
& Company's tender offer cost Gerber shareholders at least seven
dollars per share and probably more.4 3 With future tender offers
expected to present even higher premiums for select companies,"'
the economic consequences of a successful defense stance might be
devastating for target shareholders. Only imposition of a higher
fiduciary standard for target directors will moderate directors' abil-
ity to perpetuate their own control and compel those to protect the
investment interests of the target shareholders.
B. A Procedural Proposal: Shifting the Burden of Proof
The Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Cheff pinpointed an
extremely critical consideration that Condec implicitly rejected.
Recognizing the potential conflict of interest that confronts direc-
tors who cause the corporation to repurchase its own shares during
the pendency of a takeover bid, Cheff placed the burden of proof on
the target's directors to defend the repurchase as having been ef-
140. See R. POsNER, supra note 138, at § 14.6.
141. See Ehrbar, supra note 13, at 91.
142. Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978).
143. On April 17, 1977, Anderson, Clayton & Company offered to purchase any and all
outstanding shares of Gerber common for $40 per share. On September 19, 1977, Anderson,
Clayton withdrew its offer and the Gerber market price fell from $34 to $28 per share. By the
date of trial, the price had risen to $33. Consequently, Gerber shareholders lost an opportunity
to tender for $40, losing at least $7 and possibly $12 per share. Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co.,
454 F. Supp. 1310, 1316 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
144. See Ehrbar, supra note 13, at 92.
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fected primarily to further the corporate interest."' This standard
for shifting the burden of proof to target directors upon the mere
allegation of self-dealing reflects a judicial recognition that target
directors are the best source of evidence indicating whether target
directors acted to further their own interests. Since the success of
the shareholder suit depends on whether the fact finder believes
that the target directors engaged in self-dealing, shareholders must
elicit some proof of the directors' motives, which is a state of mind
peculiarly within the knowledge of the directors."' As fiduciaries,
directors are bound to further the interests of their shareholders.
Shifting the burden of proof simply requires directors to set forth
evidence sufficient to prove that an action potentially taken in fur-
therance of the directors' personal interests actually was intended
to and did further shareholder interests. Furthermore, placing the
burden of proof on target directors is consonant with the economic
policy of maintaining a market for corporate control and furthers
the contemporary corporate policy requiring directors to maximize
their shareholders' investment yield.
Because directors who take action that defeats a takeover bid
confront a very real conflict of interests, Cheff's procedural standard
for shifting the burden of proof should be adopted. Future decisions
should require that directors justify their actions if the complaining
shareholder alleges that the target directors acted primarily to fur-
ther personal interests and alleges facts sufficient to indicate that
those directors faced a conflict of interests. The first allegation is
quite simple. The second allegation requires definition. Directors
face a conflict of interests when their personal reasons for reaching
a decision might differ from their shareholders' primary interests.
Under this definition directors face a conflict of interests whenever
a tender offeror offers target shareholders a premium over market
price, regardless whether the offeror desires to displace or maintain
the present directors. In either case, the directors' interests might
differ from their shareholders' interests.147
145. Although Cheff expressly shifted the burden of proof to target directors because
they confronted inherent conflicts of interest, Condec expressly refused to shift the burden
of proof. 43 Del. Ch. at 365, 230 A.2d at 776-77. Subsequent cases have readopted Condec's
standard by shifting the burden of proof only after shareholders establish that their directors
had acted in their own interests. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
146. Placing the burden of proving a fact on the person who has peculiar knowledge of
that fact long has been recognized as a proper evidentiary standard. See 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2486 (3d ed. 1940). Although this rule is invoked only when the circumstances so demand,
fairness compels that directors, as fiduciaries, assume the burden of proof.
147. Whether the offeror desires to displace or maintain present directors, the directors
may nevertheless have a personal interest in maintaining the corporation as an autonomous
enterprise so that they will not have to report to anyone other than themselves. This interest
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C. A Substantive Proposal: Justifying Defensive Action
The decisions in Condec and Cheff recognize a director's right
to defend a takeover bid under two circumstances-first, if the de-
fensive action furthers an independent, justifiable corporate pur-
pose, and second, if after reasonable investigation, the directors
believe that the offeror presents a threat to corporate interests. 8
Absolving directors of liability upon proof that the defensive action
furthered an independent, justifiable corporate purpose avoids the
ultimate concern whether the directors fulfilled their fiduciary obli-
gations. If directors may avoid liability upon proof that defensive
action simultaneously furthers some corporate purpose, directors
will implement only those defensive strategies that involve an un-
dertaking in which the corporation may justifiably engage in the
absence of a control struggle. For example, the target might repur-
chase its own shares for the ostensible purpose of implementing an
employee stock ownership plan,"' or merge with a third company
that the offeror would be unable to acquire.so Consequently, this
standard of nonliability allows target directors to avoid the primary
issue whether they acted to further their shareholders' interests.
The second circumstance, proof that target directors reasona-
bly believed the offeror posed a threat to the corporation's interests,
squarely meets the issue of directors' fiduciary duties insofar as it
recognizes that directors are in fact responding to the takeover
threat by engaging in defensive tactics. Permitting target directors
to justify defensive actions as necessary to protect the corporation
clearly might be adverse to their shareholders' interest in tendering their shares and receiving
the premium.
148. Both Condec and Cheff considered whether the defensive action under scrutiny
served either to further an independent corporate purpose or to defend against a threat to
the corporation's best interests. See notes 122-24 supra and accompanying text. Neither court
expressly required proof of both purposes, and the Cheff court found that the target directors
reasonably believed that the offeror, Maremont, posed a threat to corporate purpose. The
Cheff court, however, accepted the lower court's rejection of the target director's contention
that the stock repurchase was made to enable Holland Furnace to implement an employee
stock ownership plan. See 41 Del. Ch. at 505-07, 199 A.2d at 555-56. Thus the court found an
absence of independent corporate purpose. This finding implicitly suggests that proof of
either purpose will absolve directors of liability.
149. See, e.g., Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
150. For example, a target might merge with a smaller company engaged in some
industry that competes with the offeror or one of its subsidiaries. Such an action potentially
would raise antitrust problems if the tender offer were consummated. In IC's hostile bid to
take over Pet, problems arose because Pet was engaged in the final negotiations of a merger
with Hardee's, which IC did not want to acquire. After a brutal round of negotiations, Pet
agreed to accept IC's proposal-without Hardee's-and IC agreed to pay Hardee's legal
expenses. See Wysocki, Takeover Tussle: IC Bid to Gain Control of Pet Inc. Stirred Up Wide-
Ranged Battle, Wall St. J., Aug. 7, 1978, at 1, col. 6.
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from express or implied threats of manipulation, however, incor-
rectly implies that the corporation's and its shareholders' interests
diverge."' In fact, these interests do not diverge; directors, as fidu-
ciaries must be required to further the interests of the shareholders
whose investment gives the corporation its existence and the direc-
tors their positions. If its shareholders desire to dissolve their corpo-
ration because dissolution will yield those shareholders their highest
investment return, the corporation's directors have no standing to
contest that decision as "not in the corporation's best interests.""
Consequently, the second Cheff-Condec standard fails to compel
target directors to meet the fiduciary obligations that arise when
shareholders entrust their investment dollars.
A proposed substantive standard that directors must meet to
justify successsful defensive action thus should ensure that directors
recognize their shareholders' interests and reasonably act in further-
ance of those interests. The strictest standard furthering the recog-
nition and protection of shareholder interests would require target
directors to take a shareholder vote during a pending or proposed
offer to determine whether shareholders desire to tender or to de-
fend. This standard is impractical and unjustified for two reasons:
first, time constraints imposed by a tender offer render impossible
a shareholder vote, and second, individual shareholders would not
accept the burden of attending a meeting that inevitably would
require days or weeks to discuss the tender offer's merits.'" A some-
what lesser standard might require target directors to take a neutral
stand by allowing shareholders to "vote" through the uninfluenced
tender of their shares. This standard fails as well because it deprives
shareholders of a valuable source of information. Allowing directors
151. In Kors v. Carey, 39 Del. Ch. 47, 158 A.2d 136 (Ch. 1960), for example, the target
directors' expenditure of corporate funds to buy out a prospective insurgent was u'pheld
because "directors, while bound to deal with stockholders as a class with scrupulous honesty,
may in the exercise of their honest business judgment adopt a valid method of eliminating
what appears to them a clear threat to the future of their business by any lawful means
. . . . .Id. at 55, 158 A.2d at 141. See also 70 YALE L.J. 308 (1960). This holding necessarily
implies that even though target shareholders may not care whether the offeror changes the
corporate practice after cashing them out, target directors nevertheless may defend upon
perceiving this threat.
152. See ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 83 (rev. ed. 1975).
153. Nothing stated herein is intended to imply that a shareholder vote could not be
required by the target's articles of incorporation. Moreover, in close corporations, directors
might be able to deduce the interests of the shareholders by personal contact and avoid the
requirement of a shareholder vote. Nonetheless, since shareholders are normally so numerous
and scattered, directors would have great difficulty in assembling a quorum within the time
allowed by the offeror. See Statement of the Business Roundtable, The Role and Composition
of the Board of Directors of the Large Publicly Owned Corporation, 33 Bus. LAW. 2083, 2095
(1978).
602 [Vol. 32:575
TENDER OFFER LIABILITY
to oppose a tender offer by instituting defense tactics not only af-
fords directors the opportunity affirmatively to meet their fiduciary
obligations but also insures shareholders access to inside informa-
tion that target directors might uncover. For example, through
numerous sources the target's directors might discover that the of-
feror intends to reduce dividends in an exchange offer, or freeze-out
minority shareholders at a price lower than the tender offer price in
a pro-rata cash offer.'
A proposed substantive standard therefore should entitle direc-
tors to defend against a tender offer without prior shareholder ap-
proval as long as they reasonably believe that a successful defense
furthers shareholders' interests. Because contemporary notions of
separation of ownership and control justify the assumption that the
shareholders' predominant interest is financial,"' directors should
be absolved from liability for defeating a tender offer only if they
reasonably believed, as a result of objective investigation, that de-
feating the tender offer would yield target shareholders their highest
investment return. Imposition of a requirement that directors con-
154. In Anderson, Clayton & Company's bid for Gerber Products, for example, Gerber's
directors felt that an important consideration in instituting defense tactics was Anderson,
Clayton's record of foreign bribes. Gerber filed suit under § 14(e) of the Williams Act to force
Anderson, Clayton to provide more detailed disclosure of admitted foreign payments. The
court held that Gerber's shareholders had a right to know about Anderson, Clayton's integ-
rity. Moreover, the information was deemed material because in those countries where pay-
ments were discontinued, sales began to fall. Thus, in many instances, target management
might be a valuable source to target shareholders of knowledge about a prospective offeror.
See Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978), discussed in [1978]
CORP. L. GumE (CCH) 11 11,061. See also Note, A Proposal for Affirmative Disclosure by
Target Management During Tender Offers, 75 CoLum. L. REv. 190, 190-92 (1975).
155. Professor Posner has outlined the economic realities supporting this assumption:
The typical shareholder (except in the closely held corporation or where one shareholder
owns a very large percentage of the shares of the corporation) is not knowledgeable about
the business of the firm, does not derive an important part of his livelihood from it, and
neither expects nor has an incentive to participate in the management of the firm. He
is a passive investor and, because of the liquidity of his interest, has only a casual and
frequently quite transitory relationship with the firm. His interest like that of a creditor
is a financial rather than managerial interest. In a technical sense the shareholders
"own" the corporation but they do not own it in the same sense in which they own their
own automobiles; it would be better to speak of their owning the common stock of the
corporation.
R. POSNER, supra note 138, § 14.5, at 301.
Moreover, imposition of a higher fiduciary standard that relies on this assumption com-
ports with contemporary notions that shareholders essentially are "voteless" insofar as they
must rely on the managerial discretion of directors, with recourse only in their right to vote
in subsequent elections of directors. Requiring directors to protect their shareholders' invest-
ment interests during the "invulnerable" period between elections of directors furthers the
fulfillment of fiduciary obligations in our modem society of limited shareholder democracy.
See M. EISENBERG, THE STaucruRE OF THE CORPORATION, A LEGA. ANALYSIS § 3.3, at 24 (1976);
A. BERLE & G. MEANs, supra note 135, at 277-87.
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sider only the investment yield to their shareholders comports with
traditional economic realities of a shareholder's position and com-
pels directors to fulfill fiduciary obligations by best benefiting their
shareholders."' Furthermore, requiring directors to reach a defense
decision only after reasonable investigation ensures the accuracy of
the directors' informed decision and is consonant with the investiga-
tive duty imposed by Cheff and Condec.
D. Summary
Adoption of this proposed higher standard of fiduciary responsi-
bility-shifting the burden of proof upon the allegation of directors'
self-dealing when confronted with conflicts of interest, and requiring
directors to justify defense action as taken to yield shareholders
their highest investment return-serves several practical purposes.
Primarily this standard compels directors to investigate the tender
offer's overall investment impact and to document their reasons for
instituting defensive action. Since the propriety of their defense
decision depends on whether objective evidence reasonably justified
that decision, directors would have to resort to the informed but
objective advice of outside counsel and third party investment
bankers.15 Objective evidence to be considered should include, in
the case of an exchange offer, whether the projected future yield of
the offeror's securities exceeds the expected future yield of retained
target securities. In the case of a cash offer, the evidence should
include whether the projected future yield of the reinvested cash
exceeds the expected future yield of retained target securities.,"
This stricter standard thus will compel directors to fulfill fiduciary
obligations by considering only the best interests of their sharehold-
156. For a discussion of whether directors must act to benefit shareholders in a market
sense, see Bromberg, Tender Offers: Safeguards and Restraints-An Interest Analysis, 21
CASE W. L. Rav. 613, 655-56, 680 (1970); Liman, Has the Tender Offer Movement Gone Too
Far, 23 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 687 (1978). See also Small, Defending Target Companies: General
Perspectives, 32 Bus. LAw. 1349 (1977).
157. This emphasis on investigative duty in effect gives directors a due diligence de-
fense. As in the federal securities law context, meeting this due diligence standard requires
directors to apprise themselves of all relevant and material information and to reach an
objective impartial determination whether that evidence justifies implementation of defense
maneuvers that deprive target shareholders of an investment alternative. Accordingly, the
informed but objective advice of third parties not confronted with the same conflicting inter-
ests as shareholders would be vital to establishing a due diligence defense. See generally
Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
158. For a discussion of various relevant market factors that directors should consider
in reaching a decision that institution of defense tactics best furthers a shareholder's invest-
ment return, see Small, supra note 156, at 1350-52. Since the shareholder, as a market
investor, can be expected to reinvest the cash price, directors must and should assume that
the reinvestment will yield only the average market return.
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ers. Furthermore, the proposed standard will maintain a competi-
tive market for corporate control insofar as it restricts a director's
capacity to interfere with a tender offer if the offering price is suffi-
ciently high to yield target shareholders the highest investment re-
turn.59
V. THE IMPACT OF Singer v. Magnavox Co.
In Singer v. Magnavox Co.10 the Delaware Supreme Court held
that a majority shareholder breaches his fiduciary obligation owed
to minority shareholders when he transacts a merger solely to elimi-
nate the minority's interest.'"' According to the court, in an inter-
ested merger transaction, 6 2 the majority shareholder assumes the
burden of proving both that the majority transacted the merger for
some legitimate corporate purpose and that the transaction was
entirely fair to the cashed-out minority. The court concluded that
a legitimate corporate purpose is not established if the majority
approved the merger for the sole purpose of eliminating minority
shareholders.' Thus Singer expressly adopted a corporate purpose
requirement that majority shareholders must establish to satisfy
their fiduciary obligations to minority shareholders.'
159. Conceptually, this standard should apply to defense action taken in anticipation
of a tender offer as well as to action taken after announcement of a tender offer. The difficulty
in analysis arises, however, in the former situation because directors cannot measure what
an offeror might offer if no tender offer is announced. Thus, in a preoffer defense tactic suit,
a director should be held only to some proof that a defense tactic would tend to yield a higher,
rather than a lower, price.
Any remedy formulated under the proposed standards must serve both to deter target
directors and to compensate aggrieved target shareholders. In formulating a remedy, however,
courts must be sensitive to that remedy's potential effect. If the complaining shareholders
still own an equity interest in the corporation, granting full compensation might bankrupt
individual directors and thereby harm the corporation's chances of future success. Courts
therefore might consider imposing liability only to the limits of the directors' liability insur-
ance or restraining directors from interfering with future tender offers without prior court
approval. Whatever remedy the courts adopt, it must protect both the shareholders' and the
corporation's interests.
160. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
161. Under the Delaware long-form merger statute, DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 251 (1975), upon
a two-thirds vote, the majority shareholders may merge their corporation and force the minor-
ity shareholders to exchange their shares for cash. Delaware also provides that dissatisfied
minority shareholders may seek a judicial appraisal of their shares if they feel the price offered
is inadequate. DEL. CODE, tit. 8, § 262 (1975).
162. An interested merger occurs when the corporate parties share common interests
or directors and typically occurs in a parent's merger with its majority-owned subsidiary. See
E. FOLK, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORAE LAw 333 (1972).
163. 380 A.2d at 980.
164. After Singer, the Delaware court, in Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., 379 A.2d
1121 (Del. 1977), held that the majority meets this business purpose requirement upon proof
that the parent's corporate purposes were satisfied, even though the cashed-out shareholders
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The Singer decision potentially affects the tender offer defense
analysis in two ways. First, it revives acknowledgement that fidu-
ciaries might satisfy fiduciary obligations by proof that their action
furthered some legitimate corporate purpose. Second, it implies
that directors will not be held liable for acting to the detriment of
shareholders unless their sole motivation is improper. Extension of
the Singer standards to a target shareholder's action against target
directors for interfering with a tender offer therefore might result in
a judgment for the target directors if those directors establish that
resisting the tender offer served some traditional corporate purpose,
or if they establish any legitimate motive for resisting other than a
desire to perpetuate their own control.15
Confined to its facts, the Singer decision clearly serves as a
compromise between conflicting judicial and state interests. The
Singer court recognized the state's interest in allowing freeze-out
mergers as evidenced by its adoption of a freeze-out merger statute.
Accordingly, the court imposed on majority shareholders a fiduciary
obligation sufficiently stringent only to proscribe the majority's
abuse of their merger power, thereby furthering both the state inter-
est and the judicial interest in protecting minority shareholders.)"
In the tender offer defense context, however, the conflicting inter-
ests are entirely judicial, and the judiciary therefore may impose a
higher fiduciary obligation without interfering with state inter-
ests.' In devising a fiduciary standard governing a director's legal
held an interest in the subsidiary. Id. at 1124. This holding reduces Singer's impact but is
proper insofar as the minority shareholder's right to contest the merger arises not from his
status as shareholder, but from the legitimacy of the majority's interest in transacting the
merger. See McBride, Delaware Corporate Law: Judicial Scrutiny of Mergers-The After-
math of Singer v. The Magnavox Company, 33 Bus. LAw. 2231, 2239 (1978).
165. Permitting directors to justify defense actions as furthering some legitimate corpo-
rate purposes affirms the result reached in Condec and should be roundly criticized as failing
to enforce properly defined fiduciary obligations.
Permitting directors to avoid liability by proving the existence of any legitimate motive
other than self-dealing approaches the business judgment standard and its accompanying
presumption in favor of managerial discretion.
166. This compromise between state and judicial interests explains the court's holding
in Tanzer v. International General Industries. See note 164 supra. In Tanzer the court permit-
ted the majority shareholder to establish a legitimate corporate interest with proof that the
merger furthered the parent corporation's business purpose. This holding acknowledges the
court's deference to the state's interest in allowing freeze-out mergers by circumscribing the
majority's legal capacity to transact this type of merger for very broad purposes, thus imply-
ing that the court believed that this broad standard would satisfy fiduciary obligations in a
manner least restrictive of the state's interests.
167. This discussion is based on the premise that fiduciary standards in the corporate
area are flexible and should be sufficiently stringent to serve whatever interests are adopted.
Thus a court must consider all circumstantial facts, recognize the interests involved, and
formulate a fiduciary standard that will compel the fiduciary to act in a manner that best
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capacity to defend against a tender offer, courts must compromise
between competing economic considerations: the promotion of free
transferability of corporate shares and the interest in giving defer-
ence to a director's business judgment. Since social and economic
policies greatly favor the free transferability of shares," courts are
free to formulate a fiduciary standard sufficiently stringent to pro-
tect these interests even at the cost of infringing on director's free-
dom to make unchallenged business decisions. Therefore, the logic
and holding of Singer are inapplicable to shareholders' challenges
of their directors' decisions to defend against tender offers. Courts
faced with this issue should reject the fiduciary standard adopted
by Singer and apply the more stringent proposed standard that
adequately protects the shareholders' interest in their investment
return.
VI. CONCLUSION
Recent federal and state emphasis on heightened directorate
fiduciary responsibility reflects a public demand that those persons
entrusted with corporate funds place the interests of their benefici-
aries ahead of their own. The enforcement of fiduciary responsibili-
ties remains a critical economic component of our contemporary
corporate structure of.passive investment entrusted to professional
management. Without the assurance that directors are bound by
law to protect and enhance their beneficiaries' investment, passive
investors would be less willing to commit resources to the private
corporation. Consequently, proper articulation and application of
fiduciary standards in a manner designed to enhance the investors'
wealth promote the efficient allocation of private resources and a
corresponding refinement of our economic system."'
With the corporate form and the range of permissible corporate
activity assuming greater complexity, proper articulation of fidu-
ciary standards becomes a more difficult task. Traditional fiduciary
standards favoring noninterference, such as the business judgment
rule, no longer guarantee corporate and shareholder protection. The
Delaware decision in Singer v. Magnavox Co. evidences judicial
recognition that traditional fiduciary standards must be flexibly
defined and applied to a director's action during a complex merger
transaction. Defensive action taken during a tender offer presents a
similar possibility that directors might act in a manner that harms
serves the adopted interests. For a discussion of factors giving rise to a flexible application of
fiduciary responsibilities in a merger context, see McBride, supra note 164, at 2246-49.
168. See text accompanying note 140 supra.
169. See Sommer, supra note 136, at 527.
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either the corporation, its shareholders, or both. Accordingly, courts
must adopt and apply a flexible fiduciary standard to a director's
decision to resist a tender offer to ensure that directors act in the
interests of those persons who have placed trust in the director's
good faith and competency.
Since today's passive shareholder most frequently is interested
only in his investment return, directors must assume that share-
holders primarily are interested in whether directors act to maxi-
mize shareholders' investment yield. A director's response to a
tender offer proposal greatly affects a shareholder's return.. There-
fore, a proper fiduciary standard for testing the defense decision
should demand that directors act in a manner that maximizes their
shareholders' wealth. Shifting the burden of proof to directors to
establish that their shareholders' investment interests were the fore-
most consideration in acting to defeat a takeover bid adequately
compels directors to fulfill properly defined fiduciary responsibili-
ties.
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